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Abstract. Computers that negotiate on our behalf hold great promise
for the future and will even become indispensable in emerging applica-
tion domains such as the smart grid and the Internet of Things. Much
research has thus been expended to create agents that are able to ne-
gotiate in an abundance of circumstances. However, up until now, truly
autonomous negotiators have rarely been deployed in real-world appli-
cations. This paper sizes up current negotiating agents and explores a
number of technological, societal and ethical challenges that autonomous
negotiation systems have brought about. The questions we address are:
in what sense are these systems autonomous, what has been holding
back their further proliferation, and is their spread something we should
encourage? We relate the automated negotiation research agenda to di-
mensions of autonomy and distill three major themes that we believe will
propel autonomous negotiation forward: accurate representation, long-
term perspective, and user trust. We argue these orthogonal research
directions need to be aligned and advanced in unison to sustain tangible
progress in the field.
1 Introduction
Negotiation, the process of joint decision making, is pervasive in our society [21].
Whenever actors meet and influence each other to forge a mutually beneficial
agreement, a form of negotiation is at work [42].
Negotiation arises in almost every social and organizational setting, yet many
avoid it out of fear or lack of skill and this contributes to income inequality, po-
litical gridlock and social injustice [16]. This has led to an increasing focus on the
design of autonomous negotiators capable of automatically and independently
negotiating with others. This interest has been spurred since the beginning of
the 1980s with the work of early flag bearers such as Smith [38] and Sycara [39].
Automated negotiation research is fueled by a number of benefits that com-
puterized negotiation can offer, including better (win-win) deals, and reduction
in time, costs, stress and cognitive effort on the part of the user. Moreover, au-
tonomous negotiation will soon become not just desired but required in instances
where the human scale is simply too slow and expensive. For instance, with the
world-wide deployment of the smart electrical grid and the must for renewable
energy sources, flexible devices in our household may (re-)negotiate complex
energy contracts automatically. Another example is the rise of the Internet of
Things (IoT), which will introduce countless smart, interconnected devices that
autonomously negotiate the usage of sensitive data and make trade-offs between
privacy concerns, price, and convenience.
To properly fulfill its representational role in an ever-dynamic environment, a
negotiation agent has to balance and adhere to different aspects of autonomous
behavior, including self-reliance and the capability and freedom to perform its
actions, while at the same time remaining interdependent in its joint activity with
the user. While many successes have been achieved in advancing various degrees
of autonomy in negotiating agents, it is readily apparent that fully-deployed
and truly autonomous negotiators are still a thing of the future. Continued
development will be required before agents will be able to forge even mundane
agreements such as the personalized renewal of our energy or mobile phone
contracts. This begs the obvious question: what is still lacking currently and
what is needed for autonomous negotiators to be able to fulfill their promise?
This paper discusses the challenges and upcoming application domains for
(almost) entirely autonomous negotiation on people’s behalf. We describe the
technological challenges associated with these future domains and provide a
roadmap towards full autonomy, together with stops along the way, highlight-
ing what we deem important solution concepts for enabling future autonomous
negotiation systems. As a basis for our discussion, we provide a unifying view
of autonomous negotiation based on three orthogonal dimensions of autonomy
that research has focused on so far: being self-sufficient, self-directed, and inter-
dependent. We argue that automated negotiation opportunities of tomorrow are
calling for a combined effort in addressing these three pillars of a negotiator’s
autonomy.
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Table 1. Overview of major challenges in autonomous negotiation and the main di-
mensions of autonomy to which they relate. Each challenge is subdivided in building
blocks along with example opportunities and a solution roadmap.
This paper does not aim to survey all research or challenges in the field com-
prehensively, but rather presents pointers to what we consider important focal
points for autonomous negotiation, now and in the future. We pinpoint and
elaborate on the following major challenges for autonomous negotiation:
1. Domain knowledge and preference elicitation;
2. Long-term perspective; and
3. User trust and adoption.
Lastly, this paper also pays homage to the 2001 landmark publication by Jen-
nings et al. [25] and asks what has happened, 16 years later, with the prospects
and challenges of automated negotiation. We examine which main challenges
have been addressed, and which stay relevant in a world that offers more oppor-
tunities for automated negotiation than ever before.
2 The Autonomy Diagonal of Negotiation
Autonomous negotiation is more than just automated negotiation; it is the free-
dom to negotiate independently. Rather than being uni-dimensional, autonomy
incorporates at least two components [9]: self-sufficiency (the capability of the
actor to take care of itself) and self-directedness (the freedom to act within
the environment and the means to reach goals). Following [26] we distinguish
a third dimension called support for interdependence – being able to work with
others and influence and be influenced by team members. Note that the notion
of autonomy is notoriously difficult to capture (see [26] for an overview). We are
concerned here with those aspects especially relevant for negotiation and for their
autonomy in relation to their environment; an alternative, more self-contained
definition, for example, is an agent’s ability to generate its own goals [29].
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Fig. 1. By and large, negotiation research can be clustered around one of the three
main orthogonal dimensions of autonomy: self-sufficiency, self-directedness, and inter-
dependence. The efforts of the three need to be integrated to arrive at truly autonomous
negotiators that can progress along the autonomy diagonal.
We can distinguish three strands of research in automated negotiation that each
cluster around one of the three dimensions of autonomy (Fig. 1):
Negotiation support systems. These systems are designed to assist and train
people in negotiation. Some of these systems, such as the Inspire system [27], have
been widely employed in real-life. However, while negotiation support systems
enable interdependence by design, humans predominately supervise and make
decisions on the appropriate outcome, which results in low self-sufficiency and
self-directedness.
Game theoretical approaches and trading bots. Game theory’s dominant
concern is with fully rational players and what each should optimally do. This
approach is therefore called symmetrically prescriptive [36]. The focus is on ei-
ther equilibrium strategies or protocols that can guarantee a good outcome for
both players through mechanism design [42]. Agents have a reduced scope for
self-directedness in such settings, as they are relatively simple and need to con-
form to certain strategies (e.g. to bid truthfully in an auction) [33]. Similarly,
real-world trading bots mostly employ simple rule-based functions which have
been hard-coded in advance. Examples of this type are among the most advanced
autonomous negotiators in terms of self-sufficiency, such as high frequency trad-
ing agents for financial exchanges, advertising exchanges, or sniping agents used
in eBay [23]. While these approaches are able to function without human inter-
vention and can be highly self-sufficient, they are constrained in terms of freedom
to direct the process.
Negotiation analytical approaches. Negotiation analysis prescribes how
players should act given a description of how others will act. That is, this field
is concerned with an asymmetrical prescriptive/descriptive view of autonomous
negotiation [36]. Much research on what are often dubbed simply ‘negotiation
agents’ (or ‘heuristics’ in game theory literature) falls into this category; e.g. all
negotiation agents from the annual negotiation competition [4]. A key feature of
this approach is the agent’s ability to make judgment calls without intervention
(i.e. to construct beliefs based on partial information and act in best response
to this belief, typically over opponent types or strategies), while the agent’s
preferences are often considered externally given. This locates the negotiation
analytical approach around the self-directed axis.
As can be gleaned from the fields indicated above, autonomous negotiation has
garnered attention from different research directions and has managed to ad-
vance in key aspects of autonomous behavior. As a result, we now have nego-
tiators that exist independently in the real world, delegated with a gamut of
available strategies to freely choose among, and that can engage in supportive
interdependence; just not all at the same time.
This may explain why it has proven difficult to extend the progress made in
this field to truly representative negotiating agents. Of course we acknowledge
that to a lesser degree, combined work on all dimensions has been performed
(as depicted by the three-colored cube in Figure 1); we simply argue that the
main automated negotiation research lines have developed in parallel to one
of the three autonomy directions. Research-wise, it is unquestionably a sound
strategy to first explore the autonomy axes in separation. As Figure 1 suggests,
we can make substantive progress in autonomous negotiation by continuing to
advance along the autonomy diagonal, which has inspired the focal points of the
challenges we present in the next section.
3 Major Challenges
The various aspects of autonomy drive three major open challenges for au-
tonomous negotiation, of which the overall theme can be summarized as trusted
and sustained representation. We describe the challenges and their building
blocks below, together with a number of explicit opportunities in each case (see
Table 1 for an overview).
Just like autonomy itself, each challenge outlined here is multi-dimensional ;
i.e., each challenge pertains to at least two dimensions of autonomy, thereby
providing the impetus to further advance along the autonomy diagonal. Note
that many of these challenges intersect and cannot be entirely untangled; for
example, adequate user preference extraction will not only increase the user
model accuracy, but may also boost user trust.
3.1 Domain knowledge and preference elicitation
Co-dependence between user and agent requires that they synchronize their
world model. This requirement relates mainly to the agent’s self-sufficiency and
interdependence, which can be enhanced by imparting the agent with accurate
and timely user preferences about the negotiation process and co-constructing
the real-world intricacies of the domain.
Preference elicitation on-the-fly In order to faithfully represent the user, an
autonomous negotiator needs to engage with the user to make sure it constructs
an accurate preference model. However, users are often unwilling or unable to
engage with a negotiation system, and hence prudence needs to be exercised
when interacting with the user to avoid elicitation fatigue. This is especially
important in domains where people are notably reluctant to engage with the
system at length, for instance in privacy and IoT negotiations.
As a consequence, automated negotiators of the future are required to not
only strike deals with limited available user information, but also to assess which
additional information should be elicited from the user, while minimizing user
bother. This challenge is still as relevant (and for the most part still unaddressed)
as when it was raised in [25]. However, we believe future research should partic-
ularly emphasize preference elicitation on-the-fly : that is, active preference ex-
traction during negotiation(s). Potential benefits include a significantly reduced
initial preference elicitation phase (as featured in many negotiation support sys-
tems) and the ability to select the most informative query to pose to the user at
the most relevant time.
To facilitate this, new performance-based metrics are required that can assess
how supplementary preference information influences negotiation performance.
Adaptive utility elicitation models provide a good starting point for represent-
ing probabilistic utility-based preferences that allow for incremental updating
over time (e.g. using Bayesian reasoning) in the vein of [10]. The viability of a
negotiation query can for instance be measured in terms of the expected value
of information [7] in order to assess the marginal utility of altering belief states.
Another challenge is for a negotiation strategy to determine its actions effec-
tively in light of its imprecise information state. Techniques for decision making
under uncertainty could assist in this and could thereby give rise to novel nego-
tiation strategy concepts, for instance by incorporating the notion of expected
expected utility [8] to express the expected negotiation payoff over all possible
instantiations of the user model.
The above discussion largely follows the standard assumptions of rational
choice theory: i.e. that people’s preferences can be accurately elicited. Unfortu-
nately, several idiosyncrasies of human psychology complicate these assumptions.
Not only do people often have difficulty explicitly expressing their preferences,
a person’s willingness to accept an agreement is also only partially determined
by how they feel about the final agreement. For example, Curhan’s Subjective
Value Inventory [12] identifies four factors that predict which agreements peo-
ple will accept. Besides feelings about the material outcome (e.g., “the extent
to which the terms of the agreement benefit you”), agreements are shaped by
feelings about the self (e.g., “did you lose face”), feelings about the process (e.g.,
“did the counterpart listen to your concerns”) and feelings about the relationship
(e.g., “did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship”).
Research also illustrates that elicited utility functions are highly sensitive
to subtle contextual factors. For example, framing effects emphasize that pref-
erences between outcomes can reverse depending on whether they are seen as
losses or gains with respect to some reference point. In a negotiation, the refer-
ence point is often the perceived value that the other party receives, even though
this knowledge doesn’t change the individual’s objective outcome. As a result,
outcomes can be readily manipulated simply by changing the form and nature of
information conveyed [20]. More broadly, valuations in a negotiation are shaped
by emotion, including emotions that arise from the process, but also beliefs about
what other parties feel (see, e.g., [6]). Given the highly context-sensitive nature
of on-the-fly preference elicitation, such considerations will have to be taken into
account in its design and implementation.
Domain modeling The quality of the negotiation outcome depends not only
on the faithfulness of the preference model of an autonomous negotiator, but
also on the accuracy of the domain model. The old ‘garbage in, garbage out’
truism applies here, as the quality of the offered solution depends so heavily on
a correct domain description.
However, domain modeling, and certainly formal modeling, is an expertise
that cannot be expected from an arbitrary user. Therefore, users require either
expert guidance, or explicit domain modeling support. Modeling in close coop-
eration with a domain expert runs the risk of perpetuating people’s uncertainty
about the model, thereby limiting their ability to make necessary adjustments.
When modeling support is provided by the system, the knowledge representation
language used will be inherently simple as it has to be understood by arbitrary
negotiators. This is especially important in domains where users employ auto-
mated negotiation without any expertise, such as in the smart grid, which can
result in the wrong evaluation of bids. Highly accurate models, on the other hand,
also have their disadvantages: they can display complex non-linearities [24], in
which case even assessing the utility of a proposal can prove NP-hard [13].
This inspires the following open research question: what is the impact of sim-
plifying the domain and preference models to keep the layman user on board?
An answer might come from using two models, as suggested in [22]: an accurate,
but complex one that serves as a reference model for the agent, and a more
comprehensive one for interaction with the user. Proper clarification and expla-
nation could then be elicited from a process of co-creation [35] or participatory
design [37] between modeling experts and domain experts. Ideally, a reflecting
phase should be included during and after negotiations, in which the human
(and perhaps eventually the agent) can provide feedback to allow for long-term
co-evolution.
The above points also apply to the appropriateness and understandability
of the protocol governing the negotiation. Typically, the pre-negotiation phase
provides an opportunity for the negotiation parties to engage in a debate about
what protocol to employ. A corresponding challenge is to construct a best prac-
tice repository for negotiation techniques, as mentioned in [25]. This has been
tackled at least partially through recent efforts in creating a negotiation hand-
book for negotiation protocols [30].
Whatever approach is chosen, experts in formal modeling will be needed to
instantiate a domain model that sufficiently captures its salient features. Those
experts are pivotal to the negotiation agent business model and will be respon-
sible for mapping user-understandable interests to the negotiation issues within
complex domains. These are likely to become future jobs; i.e., real estate agents
informing procurement agents of the future. Relevant research areas, and courses
for training these experts will be on collaborative and supportive modeling.
3.2 Long-term Perspective
Given the effort involved in domain modeling and preference elicitation, the
opportunities for automated negotiation are even clearer in domains where an
agent frequently faces similar negotiation situations. Most research on negotia-
tion agents, however, has focused on single encounters. The different challenges
and opportunities for such long-term negotiations hinge on the volatility of both
the opponent pool and the user’s preferences.
Repeated encounters There are many propitious opportunities for applying
negotiation in repeated encounters. For example, in community energy exchange
[2], agents can trade energy from storage and local sources between neighbor-
ing homes and businesses. Another example is the smart home, where different
occupants will have different needs and preferences and have to reach mutual
agreements, e.g. about the temperature of the house and the use of devices. Other
settings, in which the agent faces many different opponents, include self-driving
vehicles, where vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure negotiation can
play an important role (e.g., negotiating priority at intersections).
Negotiation opportunities for isolated encounters can be very limited, since
often a resource (e.g. electricity or giving way) is needed without necessarily
offering anything immediately in return (except possibly money or virtual cur-
rencies). However, explicitly considering the temporal dimension allows agents
to receive or concede something now in return for conceding or receiving the
same resource later. In other words, single-issue, distributive negotiations can
be turned into richer, multi-issue, integrative negotiations, with more scope to
achieve win-win solutions [31].
A significant challenge for long-term reciprocal encounters is that future
needs are often uncertain, and so it is difficult to commit to giving up or re-
questing specific future resources. Possible solutions involve money or virtual
currencies which can be redeemed at a later stage and can undergo tempo-
ral discounting if necessary, but they do not address the distributive nature of
multi-issue negotiation. They also introduce additional challenges: using actual
money requires an exchange rate with the resources involved, while it may not
be desirable to introduce money in certain settings; e.g. when they rely, to some
degree, on unincentivized cooperation and altruistic behavior. Virtual currencies
(including distributed ledger approaches) can be traded bilaterally in a “like for
like” manner, addressing the exchange problem, but then other issues arise, e.g.
how much does each agent receive to begin with, what happens if an agent runs
out, and to what extent do they provide a real incentive if agents can go into
debt without any consequences.
Another possible solution is to rely on altruism and using trust ratings
and reputation systems to provide the desired incentives (e.g. using favors and
ledgers [31]). In such cases, ‘altruism’ can be a self-interested strategy if this is
reciprocated at a later state, possibly involving a different opponent. While rep-
utation mechanisms are well known to incentivize cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma, more research on this is needed in the context of (repeated) automated
negotiation.
Unfortunately, negotiation methods that seek to identify efficient and fair
(envy-free) agreements face, in addition to the above, a number of psychological
challenges. People adopt a variety of interpretations as to what is fair and nego-
tiations often involve disputes over which principle to apply [40]. For example,
in the context of organ donation, the equity principle would allocate resources
on the basis of ability, effort or merit, the equality rule would treat individuals
the same, whereas the principle of need is usually achieved by allocating accord-
ing to individuals medical condition, socio-economical status or other relevant
needs. Other complications involve moral constraints on certain exchanges. For
example, it is considered morally repugnant to exchange money for bodily or-
gans, so an agreement that combines material interests with sacred values may
be seen as substantially worse than an independent evaluation of these elements
would suggest [15].
Although these challenges might seem insurmountable, there are several ways
to incorporate these biases into conventional computational methods. One ap-
proach is to incorporate psychological factors into the utility function. Indeed,
Fehr and Schmidt have shown how this can be done without violating the basic
tenets of utility theory [17]. Some of the challenges with fairness can be addressed
by making the process more transparent (Section 3.3). Another approach is to
incorporate modest psychological extensions to rational methods. For example,
framing effects can be handled through the use of prospect theory (e.g., [41]).
Non-stationary preferences While short-lived instantiations of representa-
tional agents may assume that there are some true and stationary preferences
to be elicited from the user, in long-term negotiations, these very preferences
may evolve over the course of weeks or months according to certain preference
dynamics. If an autonomous negotiator acts on elicited information for an ex-
tended period of time without accounting for existing drift in preferences, it will
erroneously fulfill outdated design objectives. Even if the drop in performance
is noticed by the user, this leads to a plunge in user trust and adoption, or a
de-facto shortened time of deployment. This is a typical example of opacity that
can result from an excess of unchecked autonomy [32]. As a result, long-term
negotiation requires an increase in co-dependence, at the cost of throttled-down
self-directedness; e.g., by repeated assessment of the preference representation
quality, with intermittent elicitation actions whenever their anticipated benefits
exceed their costs.
This reframes the challenge posed in Section 3.1 of preference elicitation
to cost-efficient tracking of non-stationary preferences in long-term negotiation,
with possible applications ranging from leisure bookings to business-to-business
(B2B) negotiations. Inspiration for tackling this challenge may come from the
area of news recommender systems, which has embraced context-dependent mod-
els [1] and preference dynamics [28] in response to the inherent need to capture
fast-paced preference evolution. Such models have promising merit for being
transfered to negotiation strategies that balance the preciseness of preference
representation with relevant and timely but costly elicitation, extending prelim-
inary work in that area [5].
3.3 User Trust and Adoption
While the agent depends on the user for knowledge and guidance (as described
in Section 3.1), the user relies on a self-directed agent for a good outcome. To
alleviate unwillingness to relinquish control and to guarantee user satisfaction
with and adherence to the final outcome, the user needs to trust the system
through co-participation, transparency, and proper representation.
User participation Lessons learned from collaborative human-robot teams
indicate that it is important to be able to escalate to the meta-level (i.e. have
humans participate) when necessary [18]. The need for escalating to a higher
authority applies whenever a negotiator represents a group or a company (e.g., a
union, or stakeholder organizations in general). In such cases, the negotiator can
only make deals that fall within certain margins. Take, for example, a helpdesk
operator with a telecom provider, authorized to offer new deals on a contract
renewal. She has only limited freedom in terms of the bounded range of possible
deals she can sign off on; in fact, she does not even really possess the freedom
to decide whether to negotiate. In case of doubt, the decision is escalated to a
different authority level.
The idea of collaborative control, or mixed-initiative control, see e.g., [19, 18]
might become essential to obtain the most out of complex negotiations. In this
envisioned line of research, each negotiation party consists of at least one human
and one negotiation agent. The agent should do the brunt of the negotiation
work to find possible agreements with the other negotiation parties and which
can presented to their human partners for feedback and new input. The research
challenge is to determine when, how, and how often to switch the initiative from
human to agent and vice versa.
Impact guarantees and providence There is an inherent tension between
increased self-directedness and trust that dampens the adoption of increasingly
autonomous negotiators: on the one hand, an autonomous negotiatior’s relevance
is directly proportional to its ability to impact the user independently in mean-
ingful ways (e.g. fiscal, well-being, reputation, and so on); but, in turn, the user’s
trust and willingness to relinquish control is conditional on understanding the
agent’s reasoning and impact. The two can be reconciled by making the out-
come space more transparent to the user, and by enabling the user to specify
the permissible means in the form of principles. The challenge is that the ne-
gotiation agent’s reasoning abilities may very well exceed the domain insights
of the (possibly nonspecialist) user, thus requiring a translation from stochas-
tic performance models of self-directed expert reasoning into laymen terms that
adequately convey expectations and risks.
Note that we suggest transparency as the key concept here, which subsumes
Jennings’ notion of predictability [25]. Predictability is essential towards the user
to instill trust, but is disastrous towards the opponent because of the potential
for exploitability – and you cannot have it both ways. We argue unpredictable
behavior is in fact desirable as a negotiation tactic as a confusing and random-
ization device, as long as its impact is transparently explained to the user.
The uncertainty inherent in negotiation can be captured in performance mod-
els and risk metrics, where the complexity should be scaled to the criticality of
impact for the user. If the performance intervals are sub-critical, then simple
guarantees on the range of possible outcomes may suffice (such as price bounds
provided by Uber for individual rides), leaving it up to the user to build and
judge the average performance model. Large investments, on the other hand,
should be carefully characterized not only by expected outcome, but also by
measures of risk, such as Conditional Value at Risk (CVar) [34].
In the end, the potency of autonomous negotiators is as much contingent on
the acceptance by their users as by their counter-parties. Possible sources of resis-
tance to adoption include established business models based on human inefficien-
cies (e.g., phone and media contracts) or anti-competitive practices (e.g., propri-
etary lock-in), which could become invalidated by autonomous (re-)negotiation.
The most promising incubators of autonomous negotiators are ecosystems in
which autonomous agents provide a unique source of societal value that is dis-
tributed over all stakeholders, as in the application of demand response for smart
grids. Open platforms for value distribution have recently seen increased atten-
tion in flagship applications such as the cryptocurrency bitcoin and the decen-
tralized world wide web Blockstack [3]. The digital API of these systems offers
fertile grounds for a level playing field for competition and may soon provide a
common interface for automated negotiators.
4 Concluding Observations
Autonomous systems that are capable of negotiating on our behalf are among
society’s key technological challenges for the near future, and their uptake is im-
portant for many critical economical application areas. In this paper, we present
a roadmap to arrive at representative and trusted negotiators that are endowed
with a long-term perspective. By continuing along this trajectory, negotiation re-
search can address perhaps the biggest challenge of all: a co-active approach that
simultaneously advances the autonomy of a negotiation agent in all its aspects.
Finally, looking even further forward, it is worth noting that people negotiate
differently through intermediaries than they would face-to-face. The literature on
representation effects suggests that people may show less regard for fairness and
ethical behavior when negotiating through a third (human) party [11]. Indeed,
human lawyers are ethically permitted and, to some extent, expected to lie on
behalf of their clients [20]. This raises the question as to whether agents should
similarly lie on behalf of a user. Analogous to recent research on ethical dilemmas
in self-driving cars, people may claim that negotiation agents should be ethical,
but sacrifice these ideals if it maximizes their profits. The natural dichotomy be-
tween recognizing the agent’s autonomy and taking responsibility for its actions
is best resolved by acknowledging user responsibility for the agent’s design objec-
tives (what should be achieved) and principles (how it should be achieved). This
also illustrates an additional impetus for having humans understand the agent:
you can only feel responsible for the agent’s actions if you know what the agent
is doing. Fortunately, some recent research on agent negotiators suggests that
people may act more ethically when negotiating via computer agents [14], but
far more research is needed to understand how artificial representation effects
arise.
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